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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-3539 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JASON MITCHELL, 
 
      Appellant  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cr-00306-003) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2018 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 29, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Jason Mitchell violated the terms of his supervised release. The District Court 
revoked his release and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment followed by additional 
supervised release. Mitchell appeals. His counsel argues that the appeal does not present 
any nonfrivolous issues and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California.1 We will 
grant the motion and affirm. 
I. 
After passing counterfeit bills at a casino, Mitchell pled guilty to conspiracy to 
utter and deal counterfeit obligations.2 The District Court sentenced him to twenty-one 
months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release. 
Mitchell completed his prison term and began his supervised release in February 
2017. Within a few months, he had committed multiple violations of the terms of his 
release. In March, the New York City police arrested him for driving with a revoked 
license. Then, twice—in April and June—Pennsylvania state troopers arrested Mitchell 
and charged him with offenses including driving under the influence. Mitchell also 
violated his release terms by failing to make required restitution payments and failing to 
undergo substance abuse and mental health evaluations. 
The probation office petitioned to revoke Mitchell’s supervised release. At his 
supervised release revocation hearing, Mitchell’s counsel indicated that Mitchell would 
                                              
1 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy), 472 (uttering), 473 (dealing). 
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admit Grade C violations, which, given his criminal history category, would warrant 
eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.3 Mitchell 
then said, “I accept responsibility, but I would like the Court to take judicial notice on a 
lot of . . . extenuating circumstances.”4 The judge answered that he would “gladly do 
that,” and Mitchell then said, “I do take responsibility for, you know, some of the 
violations, the violations that occurred in this violation report . . . .”5 Because it seemed 
that Mitchell might be equivocating, the judge directed the Government to question him, 
and he admitted each of the alleged violations. The Government requested a sentence at 
the high end of the Guidelines range, plus an additional year of supervised release. 
Mitchell’s counsel and Mitchell himself addressed the court to discuss the circumstances 
of the violations. 
The District Court stated that a sentence within the Guidelines range would 
“provide the adequate punishment and deterrence.”6 The court revoked Mitchell’s 
supervised release, and “in view of the considerations expressed in Section 3553(a),” 
sentenced him to a prison term of twelve months and a day followed by one year of 
supervised release.7 Counsel filed this appeal and then filed a motion to withdraw, 
arguing that there are not any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. 
                                              
3 U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(3), 7B1.4(a). 
4 App’x 76. 
5 Id. 
6 App’x 81. 
7 App’x 82. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Mitchell’s “offenses against the laws of 
the United States.”8 Therefore, it also had jurisdiction to revoke Mitchell’s supervised 
release.9 We have appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final judgment10 
and sentence.11 We review both the revocation of supervised release and the 
reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion.12 However, because Mitchell 
made no objections at sentencing, we would reverse only if any error met the plain-error 
standard.13 Under that standard, we may, in our discretion, grant relief if there is an error 
that is plain and affects the appellant’s substantial rights.14 
III. 
Our local rule “reflects the guidelines the Supreme Court promulgated in Anders to 
assure that indigent clients receive adequate and fair representation.”15 Under that rule, 
“[w]here, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded that the appeal 
presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and 
                                              
8 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
9 Id. § 3583(e). 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
11 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
12 United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 307 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008). 
13 United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009). 
14 Id. at 446. 
15 United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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supporting brief pursuant to [Anders].”16 When reviewing an Anders brief, we must 
determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and 
(2) whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”17 At 
the first step, the brief must show that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in 
search of appealable issues” and must “explain why the issues are frivolous.”18 If the brief 
appears adequate, our analysis at the second step does not require “a complete scouring of 
the record”;19 rather, we are “guided in reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself.”20 
Here, the brief satisfies the requirements, and our independent review of the record 
reveals no nonfrivolous issues. Counsel identifies three possible issues for appeal: (1) the 
District Court’s jurisdiction, (2) the adequacy of the proof of a violation of supervised 
release, and (3) the reasonableness of the sentence. Mitchell was given the opportunity to 
file a pro se brief, but did not do so. 
There is no issue of arguable merit with regard to jurisdiction, which the District 
Court clearly possessed.21 Nor is there any issue of arguable merit with regard to proof of 
Mitchell’s violations of his supervised release: in response to the Government’s 
questioning, Mitchell admitted each specific violation. In addition, there is no question 
                                              
16 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(a) (2011). 
17 Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 301. 
20 Id. (quoting United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231, 3583(e). 
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regarding the voluntariness of his admission. Both the judge and Mitchell’s counsel 
explained that he had the right to a hearing at which the Government would have been 
required to prove his violations. Mitchell still chose to admit the violations. 
Finally, there is no issue of arguable merit with regard to the reasonableness of 
Mitchell’s sentence. The District Court did not commit procedural error, such as 
calculating the Guidelines sentence incorrectly or imposing a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts.22 The court correctly calculated the Guidelines range: eight to fourteen 
months.23 Mitchell and his counsel both addressed the court and explained the 
circumstances of Mitchell’s violations, mainly the lack of permission to obtain a higher-
paying job outside the judicial district. The District Court did not rely on any clearly 
erroneous facts; it stated that it “considered all of [the] matters” that Mitchell and his 
counsel spoke about, as well as “the considerations expressed in Section 3553(a).”24  
The Anders brief states that Mitchell “wishes to argue that the [District Court] did 
not have authority to impose an additional year of supervised release.”25 There is no 
arguable merit to that issue. “When a term of supervised release is revoked and the 
defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a 
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 
                                              
22 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
23 U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(3), 7B1.4(a). 
24 App’x 81, 82. 
25 Anders Br. at 18. 
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imprisonment.”26 That term of supervised release “shall not exceed the term of 
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term 
of supervised release”—here, three years for Mitchell’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, a 
Class D felony—“less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of 
supervised release”—here, twelve months and a day.27 Accordingly, the District Court 
could have imposed nearly two years’ supervised release. The term actually imposed, one 
year, was well within the statutory bounds. 
Where a sentence is procedurally sound, as here, we next consider its substantive 
reasonableness.28 The sentence of twelve months and a day is within the Guidelines 
range, and the term of supervised release is well under the statutory limit. Mitchell 
committed multiple violations in rapid succession shortly after his supervised release 
began, so we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence.”29 Thus, there is no issue of arguable merit regarding the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 
the judgment and sentence. 
                                              
26 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). 
27 Id. § 3583(b)(2), (h). 
28 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
29 United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 340 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
